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More than Winners and Losers: The
Importance of Moving Climate and
Environmental Policy Debate Toward a
More Transparent Process
Victor B. Flatt

†

INTRODUCTION
Anyone examining the political economy surrounding climate change in 2012 might assume that the United States, or a
significant number of our political elite, believes that we will
emerge as some kind of “winner” in the climate change arena.
How else to explain the actions of our own country in the international arena? But as a possible reason for delaying action on
climate change, this idea may be more or less verboten in circles of environmental law scholars and policy thinkers. Are we
environmentalists the deluded peaceniks of our time? To paraphrase Neville Chamberlain, in climate change, no matter
“whichever side may call itself the victor, there are no winners,
1
but all are losers.” As in the discussion of war, “polite company” would rarely voice a sentiment celebrating winning while
others lose tremendously, but not voicing the sentiment does
not solve the problem.

† Tom & Elizabeth Taft Distinguished Professor of Environmental Law,
and Director of the Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation, and Resources
(CLEAR) at the University of North Carolina School of Law. The author would
like to thank J.B. Ruhl for his very thoughtful article, and the editors at the
Minnesota Law Review for seeking out this commentary. Also, thanks to the
hard work of my RA, Dylan Mattaway-Novak. Copyright © 2013 by Victor B.
Flatt.
1. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, IN SEARCH OF PEACE 140 (1939) (speech at
National Government Rally, Kettering, England on July 2, 1938). Chamberlain was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1937 to 1940, during
the time of negotiations with Nazi Germany and the build-up to World War II.
ROBERT C. SELF, NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN: A POLITICAL LIFE 2–3 (2006).
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Professor J.B. Ruhl’s article, The Political Economy of Cli2
mate Change Winners, seeks to break down this wall of silence.
In his article, Professor Ruhl sets out a case for the existence of
“climate change winners,” the importance of recognizing this
phenomenon for purposes of crafting climate change policy, and
policy proposals that he believes will be more effective in addressing climate change given this “winners” phenomenon.
This Article responds to Professor Ruhl’s article. It agrees
with the need to recognize the “climate change winners” perception phenomenon, but maintains that Professor Ruhl’s argument both makes too much of it and too little. In particular,
this Article shows that the phenomenon is less ignored than he
thinks, but argues that it is also the tip of a bigger and more
important iceberg concerning what environmental scholars and
policy makers have debated in terms of climate change and environmental policy generally. This Article then more fully explores the bigger problem of the policy discourse concerning
climate change and environmental law, and suggests that the
“environmental community” needs to shift its approach to the
discussion of these problems and their solutions.
In the environmental realm, we have come to a point
where even broaching the subject of relative winners compared
to losers seems like an immoral act. While I have routinely argued that environmental harms should be recognized as rights
3
of the public and seen in terms of morality, I believe that this
is an argument that stands on its own, without removing other
discussions from the table. I am concerned that if we fail to
have discussions with those who may not share our views, we
will never progress (and indeed may fall backwards) in our
analysis and policy of climate change and other environmental
problems. We can no longer ignore this issue or others that may
not be popular to discuss in the environmental movement. To
make progress, all issues must be recognized, and we must be
willing to engage in the discussion.
I. HIGHLIGHTING THE CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS
PHENOMENON
In The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, Professor Ruhl sets out to demonstrate the dearth of discussion re2. J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97
MINN. L. REV. 206 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, This Land Is Your Land (Our Right to the
Environment), 107 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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garding what he terms “climate change winners,” and why this
lack of discussion is important and problematic. The first part
of the article seeks to set out the case that there is almost a
conspiracy of silence about the concept that anyone could possibly benefit from climate change, and that there are indeed persons and communities who will benefit, at least relatively, from
4
climate change in the near and medium term.
Professor Ruhl’s discussion of the data on climate change
effects is certainly convincing with respect to some benefits. As
he notes: “Some impacts will open up opportunities for people
and businesses to secure benefits in some areas, such as by increased rainfall, longer growing seasons, and more temperate
5
weather.” And he also makes the very logical argument that,
even assuming the net impacts of climate change are negative
overall, this variance indicates that there will be some winners,
6
particularly at local scales. He then connects this phenomenon
to political actions at these scales and combinations of these
scales that could influence large-scale policy, even to the point
of undercutting efforts to try and reverse or mitigate climate
7
change.
Professor Ruhl’s thesis on climate change winners and how
they could influence policy is certainly convincing. The data cited by Professor Ruhl itself comes from the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the logic concerning the
political economy of variance in harms and benefits is unassail8
able. The longer time scales of probable massive climate impacts relative to short term phenomena also suggest how persons could approach climate change as something desirable
even if the long term effects are negative. Given these facts, one
must acknowledge how important Professor Ruhl’s article is in
naming the phenomenon of climate change winners and focusing attention on it. I am convinced that he is correct that we
must identify the phenomenon to avert more problems in crafting climate change policy. While I agree in general with his call
to recognize climate change winners, and agree that doing so
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ruhl, supra note 2, at 208–14.
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 208.
See id. at 214–15.
See id. at 207–08, 221–27 (citing the INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_
assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm).
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can influence and improve policy, I think that in some ways he
overstates the problem of lack of acknowledgement.
Professor Ruhl asserts that “scientific and policy analyses . . . pay little attention to . . . market and nonmarket bene9
fits” of climate change. If recognized, these benefits are only
“begrudgingly” acknowledged in discussion that “invariably
10
qualif[ies them] with discussion of adverse impacts.”
It is true that most official documents rarely solely discuss
the benefits from climate change, but it is also true that they
have not been routinely ignored. Professor Ruhl’s own data on
climate change benefits in agriculture and other areas come
from none other than the IPCC’s reports, which have doggedly
examined all impacts of climate change, including possible ben11
efits, at multiple levels and time scales. In its most recent report, from 2007, concerning climate change impacts, the IPCC
discusses positive and negative impacts from climate change
12
over time and the given uncertainty of these impacts. This in13
cludes increases in food productivity and timber production.
Moreover, Professor Ruhl’s conclusion that there is already
evidence that winners and losers will affect the political decision making of geographic areas supports the proposition that
we are already aware of relative winners.
In addition, I don’t believe the evidence supports Professor
Ruhl’s general conclusion that many persons who are climate
14
change winners do not necessarily recognize these benefits.
Certainly, Professor Ruhl is correct that “issue framing” matters in terms of perception; for example, someone who arguably
benefits monetarily may not perceive benefits if he or she is
15
worried about the impact on others. We certainly could use
more studies on this particular question. But even without such
surveys or much public discussion of winners and losers, most
persons and certainly many businesses appreciate the ways in
16
which even disasters can mean economic gain for some, and
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 210.
See id. at 207–08 & nn.2–3, 216–19.
See WORKING GRP. II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 11–18 (2007), available at http://www
.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf.
13. Id. at 11–12.
14. See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 269–76.
15. See id. at 236–37.
16. Joe Mont, How They (and You) Make Money off Disasters,
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that relative gain may be perceived as better than net gain. As
Professor Ruhl notes, official government documents have rec17
ognized opportunities in climate change, and surveys already
show that some people believe they will benefit from such
18
changes.
More importantly, the persistence of entrenched groups
and political positions that oppose action on climate change
mitigation is just another version of persons who perceive a net
short-term benefit from doing nothing to avert climate change,
or at least a relative cost from performing actions to mitigate it.
As Professor Ruhl notes, “[M]any people and businesses are
19
generally dug in against investing in effective mitigation.”
And I do not believe this is solely the result of selective information assimilation. As noted by Upton Sinclair almost a century ago, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something,
20
when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!” Stated more prosaically for today’s climate change discussion, we
should not be surprised that companies that make money by
manufacturing and selling products that cause increases in
greenhouse gases will not voluntarily embrace facts, or policies
based on those facts, that limit those profitable benefits.
Whether or not these contributors to greenhouse gases are hurt
by climate change, relatively speaking, they are better off than
others who are hurt because the contributors also profit from
the causes of the problem. Climate change war profiteers, if you
will, have no incentive to see the war end when their only profits come from selling the tanks. In this sense, climate change
“winners” do recognize themselves and have already had an
enormous influence on policy. Recognizing that others, such as
farmers, can also benefit is important, but it is not new.
Importantly, Professor Ruhl notes that the perception of
climate change winners depends on how those in society perceive and care about risks to others versus risks to them-

MAINSTREET
(Aug.
29,
2011),
http://www.mainstreet.com/article/
moneyinvesting/insurance/how-they-and-you-make-money-disasters.
17. Ruhl, supra note 2, at 215 (citing GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GRP., FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (2008), available at http://cms.oregon
.gov/ENERGY/gblwrm/docs/ccigreport08web.pdf).
18. Id. at 238.
19. Id. at 244.
20. UPTON SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I GOT
LICKED 109 (1935).
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21

selves. This underlies the whole article, and occasionally Pro22
fessor Ruhl points it out. This point alone deserves further
study as it is an observation about how society has changed its
attitudes on community versus individual goals. The rhetoric
surrounding the first major domestic environmental laws of the
1970s assumed a communitarian attitude or one that, even if
23
based on self-interest, assumed that interests coincide. That
has changed since the Reagan Revolution, and it may be this
underlying phenomenon that creates a situation in which action must be based on summing individual divergent interests
24
and convincing people of the need for change. To the extent
that this is true, society must examine its own definition of
moral underpinnings with eyes open in order to understand
personal behavior and the politics that result from it, including
the politics from winners.
II. THE SHUTDOWN OF POLICY DISCOURSE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GENERALLY MAY BE THE
BIGGER PROBLEM
I believe Professor Ruhl’s most important point is his observation of the apparent approbation in discussing climate
25
change winners openly in the environmental community. But
this aversion goes far beyond climate change to debate about
most major environmental laws and policies. While the progressive environmental community has been clear about its denunciations of cost-benefit analysis, and has elucidated most of
26
the reasons why, it has failed to broadly embrace a revisitation of the underlying policy goals of our environmental
statutes and debate the merits of possible trade-offs in policy
between certain forms of environmentalism and other interests,
be they economic, moral, or other environmental concerns.
I personally am fully supportive of the policies of widespread protection and shared interests in our environmental
27
laws, but by failing to openly defend and discuss them, we are
21. See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 237, 239–40.
22. Id. at 247 (stating that Professor Ruhl “assum[es that people and
businesses] act primarily out of self-interest”).
23. Victor B. Flatt, Too Big to Jail or Too Remote (or Rich) to Care?, 72
MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author).
24. Id.
25. See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 255–56.
26. Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and
Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1164 (2008).
27. See Flatt, supra note 3, at 2–6.
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skating on thin ice. It has long been noted that certain interests
perceived as anti-environmental may “hide the ball” in terms of
exaggerating the economic detriments from environmental law
28
or understating the wide-spread benefits; however, certain
environmental activists may themselves not address concerns
29
that are important to the public. This could be chalked up to
the fear of airing “dirty laundry” or giving the “other side” ammunition, but failing to have an honest discussion and debate
(even if only one-sided) may lead to policies that are best for no
30
one (or a very few) winning out.
Climate change mitigation itself provides a good example.
In many environmental debates, the solving of climate change
has become the solving of the use of fossil fuels, even though
these are not the same things. While not using fossil fuels could
have many benefits beyond climate change mitigation (less coal
waste and conventional air pollution for starters), fossil fuel reduction itself is not the only path to climate change mitigation.
When we fail to make this distinction, we give rise to criticisms
and skepticism that the environmental community really cares
less about climate change and only about getting its way.
Less than two years ago in California, there were protests
over designating a 10,000-square-foot house (which used Forest
Stewardship Council-certified wood, low volatile organic compound (VOC) paint, and many other sustainable features) as
31
“green.” According to the environmentalists protesting, the issue was not about the amount of energy or water used per se
(in theory a building of any size could be water and energy self32
sufficient), but in the sheer size of the building itself. Neighbors suggested that green buildings should only use “just
33
enough.” While this may be laudable from a moral point of
28. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 4–6 (2005).

KNOWING

29. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservative Environmental Thought: The
Bush Administration and Environmental Policy, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 308
(2005) (noting that, while Republican presidents may be perceived as less environmentally friendly than Democratic ones, they may bring other important
perspectives and innovation).
30. Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back into the Fold with a New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 12 (1999).
31. Fred A. Bernstein, How Green is My Mansion?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2012, at D4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/garden/11green
.html?pagewanted=all.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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view, it is not necessarily true in terms of the scientific facts
about environmental impacts. There are certainly many arguments to be made with respect to this kind of home under philosophy and equity, concerning relative incomes and resource
choices among the public. But, at least with respect to the cold
hard facts of the production of greenhouse gases (and even coharms), even large homes can be a positive in the fight against
climate change if they can achieve zero greenhouse gas emissions.
By failing to acknowledge that greenhouse gas reduction is
itself a discrete issue that we can and should analyze with respect to other interests and concerns, many of us pretend that
all “green” concerns come as a single package. This may prevent much of the public, particularly in “libertarian minded”
America, from taking the scientific findings seriously, believing
instead that they are part of a plot to get Americans to change
their behavior for other reasons. It can also mean bad policy as
we may fail to consider the relative importance of environmen34
tal or other concerns by focusing only on one thing.
We in the environmental community need to be clearer
both to ourselves and the general public about what the issues
with respect to the climate are, and understand that there are
a range of response options. This does not mean that we may
not disagree with some of those options (such as geoengineering), but it does mean that we need to be specific about
why such options are not preferable, and what trade-offs exist
and must be made. Where we do not have scientific certainty,
we must acknowledge it. Clearly we cannot honestly debate
what to do about climate change if we are unwilling to disentangle climate change concerns from other important and related concerns.
This applies not only to the context of climate change winners and losers, but also other environmental debates. Social
and political realities have a tremendous influence upon the
question of whether environmental harms are harmful enough
to warrant a particular level of intervention. Much of the high
level of today’s environmental concern can be traced to changing awareness of harms and the increased appreciation of natu35
ral and health values. A consideration of values may also require analysis of resource allocation preferences. Political
34. Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Dangers of Carbon Reduction Tunnel
Vision 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
35. See Flatt, supra note 3, at 21.

34

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[97:26

realities, combined with moral concerns, influence the palatability of regulating certain segments of the economy, the protection of certain populations, and the amount of funding to accomplish regulation. When faced with uncertainty, value
systems can influence who is given rights, accountability, and
responsibility for environmental harm. These values choices
can easily be obscured by debates over implementation or sci36
ence, so it is critical that they be debated openly.
It would be nice if we all wanted the same things or all won
and lost together, but we do not. Controlling greenhouses gases
or protecting endangered species may make investments under
prior regulatory contexts worthless, and this may create winners and losers. Does everyone need to win? No, but we should
be aware of who should win and why, and perhaps be open to
compensating those who are harmed. Or as in Professor Ruhl’s
example, allow them to receive the “winner’s benefits” but not
37
stay locked into that course forever.
In the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, legislators
considered one of these trade-offs in the jobs benefits versus
38
air-quality detriments of mining high-sulfur coal. But the debate was not as explicit about this choice as it could have been,
and therefore, the outcome may not have been the best. We required higher cost technological pollution control so that there
would still be jobs mining high-sulfur coal, instead of using resources to invest in other employment opportunities in coal
39
country. And we are still paying the price for that. I would
suggest that such a suboptimal outcome came from not openly
exploring the importance of jobs, lifestyle, and history in one
part of the country versus the right to be free from air pollution. Discussing these as trade-offs would have allowed us to
engage with the complexity of values.
As Michael Vandenbergh has stated, “At the outset, the
debate over establishment of the initial . . . goals could stimulate open discussion about both the importance of environmental protection and the trade-offs involved in environmental
36. See Flatt, supra note 30, at 11.
37. See Ruhl, supra note 3, at 269–76.
38. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR:
OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR
HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 45
(1981).
39. See Allan R. Gold, Bush Clean Air Plan Called Energy Policy in the Making, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1989, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1989/09/24/us/bush-clean-air-plan-called-energy-policy-in-the-making.html.
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40

measures.” Moreover, discussion of all of the issues openly
gives the legislature the ability to alter statutes as needed with
full information by all participants.
I know environmentalists are often scared of this debate
because they think the environment will lose, and it might
sometimes, but we might also be surprised. In any event, we
live in a plural society, where we must all be educated and
heard on important issues. Part of “getting there” is creating
the proper mechanisms to discuss and understand the problem
and to have ways of determining what our values are. A practical way to do this would be to know the science, separate the
science from the policy considerations, and find out which policies have the support of our plurality.
The first is addressed by opening up the discussion and debate to recognize that there are definitive scientific answers to
definitive scientific problems. This will require education as
well as different ways of constituting analysis of climate change
in organizations such as the IPCC. Once we understand the
science and its limitations, it becomes easier to disentangle policy responses. Determining public preferences is, of course, difficult as we have no ready answers to polling or understanding
the interests of the public beyond general representative democracy, which seeks to balance interests with overall welfare
enhancement. Nevertheless, simply separating out pure policy
41
from other issues allows a focus to better frame decisions.
New laws could help in some ways by funding methods to
increase participation or to have local concerns and issues
translated to larger fora. But to do that we would have to have
practical funding and participatory mechanisms, perhaps
something along the lines of the Coastal Zone Management
42
Act. We have already seen this push in discussion of disaster
43
response and preparation for disaster, and the reasoning applies to the wider environmental arena, which involves human
choice as much it does in disaster and coastal development.

40. Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New
Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J.
803, 902 (1997).
41. See Flatt, supra note 30, at 25.
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1464 (2006).
43. See Gavin Smith, Catastrophic Disaster Recovery: An Institutional
Network Perspective, in PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR CATASTROPHIC
DISASTERS (Rick Bissell ed., 2013).
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An example of this broader vision of the environment
comes from the international framework for sustainable development, which looks at both environmental protection and economic development. At the Rio+20 United Nations (U.N.) Conference on Sustainable Development and even the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change COP 15 in Copenhagen, many of the side meetings focused on how adaptation
44
funding can be accomplished. But rather than use the old
paradigm of simple funds transfer, these discussions recognized
45
that funding per se isn’t the solution. They recognized that
adapting to the challenges of climate change might require an
examination of productivity and jobs, the local environment,
46
and women’s empowerment and education. Drawing on the
recent research of international funding organizations, persons
discussing adaptation funding delivery in Copenhagen recognized that there must and will be a better way to address the
harms of climate change—and that if we are careful, we can do
so in a manner that also mitigates climate change and generally improve the lives of those affected.
CONCLUSION
Professor Ruhl is absolutely right that we must continue to
study and discuss the disparate impacts of climate change,
even if these impacts create what might be considered “winners.” He is also correct that this has implications for climate
change policy and what will and could work going forward. But
his article puts into relief an even more important phenomenon—the failure of much of the environmental community to
engage in honest debate about environmental and other values.
What does being “open” about values discussion in the environmental realm mean? What are some of the values at play
in climate change that are necessary to discuss winners and
44. Rep. of the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Dev., 48–51, June 20–22,
2012, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/16 (2012) [hereinafter U.N. Sustainable Development Report], available at http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/
814UNCSD%20REPORT%20final%20revs.pdf; Rep. of the Conference of the
Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, 6–7, 30–40, Dec. 7–19, 2009, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010) [hereinafter U.N. Conference of the Parties
Report], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
45. U.N. Sustainable Development Report, supra note 44, at 48–53 (acknowledging the need to focus on funding, technology, capacity building, trade,
and registry commitments); U.N. Conference of the Parties Report, supra note
44, at 6–7.
46. U.N. Sustainable Development Report, supra note 44, at 1–3.
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losers? We can definitively say that it isn’t about simply making our environment “natural.” Such a situation hasn’t really
existed for hundreds of years, and most people long ago, implicitly agreed to some deviance from the “natural” for purposes of
human happiness. But this is where it gets tricky. What can be
considered in deciding human happiness? Are environmental
amenities only important vis a vis how humans appreciate
them? Or do they have independent value? Or is it indeed possible to do this? What about distributional effects? With respect
to climate change in domestic law, do we only consider U.S. interests, or do we consider other interests as well? Should we be
looking at the highest aggregate benefit level, or does it matter
if harms fall disproportionately on a few?
I would state strongly that distributional values are important and that moral theory requires us to compensate those
who are harmed in climate change and other harms on a group
47
because of the actions of another group. Your values may be
different. I challenge us to openly discuss these values.
We often think our environmental laws are unassailable.
Who would vote against clean air? But we have seen again and
again that there have been many attempts to weaken underly48
ing values through administrative fiat, and in the last ten
years, even calls for explicit retreat from important principles
(such as the use of cost-benefit analysis in the setting of Clean
49
Air Act standards ). Unless we are willing to openly discuss
why underlying policy prescriptions are important, and openly
compare and balance them with others, I am afraid we will be
unready for an assault on our environmental laws that we will
not be able to repel.

47. See Flatt, supra note 3, at 19–24.
48. The Bush EPA attempted to redefine “routine maintenance, repair,
and replacement” under Clean Air Act regulations, for instance. See New York
v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
49. See Jenny Hopkinson, Bush EPA Air Chief Seeks CASAC Input on
Costs of Stricter Ozone NAAQS, INSIDEEPA.COM (Nov. 5, 2012), http://
insideepa.com/Inside-EPA-General/Inside-EPA-Public-Content/bush-epa-airchief-seeks-casac-input-on-costs-of-stricter-ozone-naaqs/menu-id565.html?s=sm.

